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1. Introduction 
 
At present, within the EU and at EU level, the debate on labour law 
and employment policy has its focus on the economic need of enterprises 
for flexibility in the work organisation, on the one hand, and its 
consequences for the workers’ security, on the other hand. For example, in 
the EU Green Paper on labour law of 2006, it is stated that European 
labour markets face the challenge of combining greater flexibility with the 
need to maximise security for all.1 The flexible work organisation is 
expected both by EU policymakers and national governments to be 
successful in the perspective of competitiveness. It is hoped that this 
subsequently will lead to stable or higher employment rates and 
heightened welfare. 
With regard to the flexibility and security debate about reviewing the 
present Directive 2003/88/EC on working time, “on-call work”, the 
exclusions and opt out from the maximum weekly working time, and, to a 
lesser extent, the related aspect of work-life balance are key legislative 
issues that have arisen. Over the past years, this debate has unfolded as a 
“dialogue” between the European legislator, the ECJ and the (European) 
social partners, and contrasting views as regards the aim of worker 
protection and the employers’ need for working time flexibility have come 
to the fore. Nevertheless, at the end of 2010, the European Commission 
consulted the social partners at EU level in the second round of 
consultation in order to readdress negotiations on the draft Working Time 
Directive. The aim is to establish a new Directive, based on a social 
                                                 
1 European Commission. 2006. Modernising Labour Law to Meet the Challenges 
of the 21st Century, COM(2006) 708 final. Brussels: European Commission. 
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partners’ agreement, which like the present one ensures minimum 
protection, whilst providing for flexibility “to cope with particular 
circumstances of countries, sectors and workers”. The Commission 
considered several developments to justify reason for the review. It points 
out, in its communication about the first phase consultation of the social 
partners from 2010,2 that the development of the knowledge-based 
economy, and the autonomy that “knowledge”-workers have with regard 
to the organisation and location of their work might be a reason to 
reconsider the application of the provisions of the Directive with regard to 
these workers. On the other hand, the group of workers that do repetitive 
work experience strain and stress, especially where there is a shortage of 
workers. For all workers it holds that working more hours is attractive 
from the point of view of their income. Within undertakings working time 
management has become more important. For instance, the costs and 
adjustment to the demand lead, in the service sector to extended 
production time and for other sectors to another spread of the production 
time. Flexible schedules and shifts are utilised in this respect. 
Optimistically, the Commission then states the benefits of these 
developments. Flexible working time might also be to the advantage of the 
worker who wishes to combine his work with his private life and for 
weaker groups in the labour market who would like to increase their 
opportunities for work and career. The primary aim of the envisaged new 
Working Time Directive would still contain the protection of health and 
safety of workers. However, according to the Commission, in light of the 
developments, other aims should be considered as well. Working time 
flexibility seems to be expressed as a possible second goal and perhaps the 
improvement of work-life balance could be a third one.  
However, despite the Commission’s intentions, so far the contrasting 
views of the European social partners have resulted in a deadlock on the 
review. A common position has not been found yet, in particular on the 
important legislative matters of on call work, the individual opt out and—
in the Commission communication somewhat suppositious—the matter of 
work-life balance. 
 In this paper the question that will be addressed is whether the 
dialogue over the past few years has only resulted in opposite points of 
                                                 
2 European Commission. 2010. Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Reviewing the Working Time 
Directive, COM(2010), (First-phase Consultation of the Social Partners at 
European Level under Article 154 of the TFEU), 106 final. Brussels: European 
Commission. 
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view on different aspects of the regulation of flexible working time.3 This 
paper argues for the contrary: based upon a close examination of the 
dialogue between the EU legislator, the ECJ and the social partners—at 
European and decentralised level—legal solutions for the impasse can be 
drawn from the interim outcomes of the dialogue between the various 
actors at different levels. Further, it will be argued that some issues about 
working time flexibility and protection as it is currently regulated are not 
fully explored in the dialogue between the actors yet. Certain aspects of 
protection in the provisions of Directive 2003/88/EC are still open to 
interpretation by the ECJ. 
Firstly, this paper presents an overview of the current EU working time 
Directive from 2003 considering aspects on security and flexibility. 
Secondly, the dialogue between the European legislator, the ECJ and the 
social partners at European and decentralised levels on such aspects of the 
Working Time Directive will be scrutinised. The research will show that 
the different actors take different positions towards the related flexibility-
security nexus and each utilise distinctive legal techniques in order to 
achieve aims of protection and/or flexibility on the topics of on call work, 
the opt out and work-life balance. Thirdly, whether certain legal outcomes 
of the dialogue would suit the goals of security and flexibility sustained in 
the new draft Directive on working time and could serve as solutions for 
the current legislative impasse will be tested.  
 
 
2. Security and Flexibility in Directive 2003/88 on 
Working Time and its Review 
 
In 1993, the first general EU Directive on Working Time was enacted. 
Its, contested,4 legal base was Art. 118a EC on health and safety (now Art. 
153 TFEU). The goals of the latter were to provide minimum standards for 
the protection of the health and safety of the worker in relation with 
                                                 
3 The theme of annual leave will be left out here. The focus is on the utilisation of 
flexible working time in a strict sense of the word. 
4 ECJ Case C-84/94 United Kingdom / Council OJ 1994 C 120/13. See Gray, M. 
1998. “A Recalcitrant Partner: The UK Reaction to the Working Time Directive,” 
in Yearbook of European Law 1997, eds. Barav A., and D.A. Wyatt, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press), 323-362; and Barnard, C. 1997. “The Judgment of the ECJ in 
United Kingdom v Council: The Working Time Directive,” in CELS Occasional 
Paper No. 2; Dashwood, A. A. 1997. “The Working Time Judgment in a Wider 
Perspective,” in CELS Occasional Paper No. 2; and Hepple, B.A. “Commentary,” 
in CELS Occasional Paper No. 2. 
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working time. Subsequently, in 2003, the Directive was amended in order 
to give a clear overview of the interim amendments of the 1993 Directive5, 
which were to adjust the provisions to the need for flexible working time 
arrangements. Consequently, Directive 2003/88/EC was enacted. With 
reference to the organisation of working time in an undertaking, its 
expressed aim is to provide for ensuring a better level of protection of the 
health and safety of the worker in the work environment (Art. 1 par. 1 
Directive 2003/88/EC). Central to this aim is the general principle of 
“humanisation of work”: adapting the work to the worker (Art. 13 
Directive 2003/88/EC), the limits of the daily, weekly (48 hours) and 
annual hours worked, for night work, and the entitlements to rest and 
annual leave. However, security aspects are key in the development of 
working time flexibility in the working time in undertakings. Recital 15 of 
the Directives’ preamble states that it is  
 
desirable to provide for flexibility in the application of certain 
provisions of this Directive, whilst ensuring compliance with the 
principles of protecting the safety and health of workers.  
 
Flexibility is incorporated in the Directive via the following legal 
techniques: 
- the use of reference periods, allowing for surpassing the maxima at 
the short term, provided that the extra hours will be compensated within 
the given reference period (Art. 16);  
- exclusions or derogations of the key provisions of the directive for 
unmeasured or predetermined working time of certain type of workers 
(Art. 17 par 1 Directive 2003/88/EC, Art. 20 and 216), for certain work, 
workers or sectors (Art. 17 par 3-5 and Art. 19 Directive 2003/88/EC); 
- options to derogate from several provisions by collective agreements 
of the social partners at the appropriate level in the Member State (Art. 18 
and 19 Directive 2003/88/EC);7 
                                                 
5 European Commission. 2002. Directive 2000/34/EC, Proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning Certain Aspects of the 
Organisation of Working Time (Codified Version), COM(2002), 336 final. 
Explanatory Memorandum. Brussels: European Commission, 2.  
6 Directive 1999/63/EC on the working time of sea farers. 
7 The Directive further allows the MS extensive legislative derogation for several 
types of workers and activities with regard to the daily and weekly rest periods, 
annual leave, the maximum length of night work and, to a limited extent, with 
regard to the maximum reference periods (Art. 17 and 19). Derogation is also 
allowed by collective agreements at national or regional level, or, in conformity 
with the national or regional rules, at decentralised level. MS may lay down rules 
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- the individual option to opt out from the maximum working week of 
48 hours (Art. 22 Directive 2003/88/EC).  
Thus, the Directive seems to permit for ample working time flexibility 
strategies, whenever the national legislation or collective agreements 
authorise these strategies. The hazards inflicted upon the health and safety 
of workers are considered to be tolerable and adequately limited and—in 
reference to night work and health problems—countered by specific rights 
to health surveillance and to a transfer to day work, respectively, as laid 
down in chapter three of the Directive  
Hereafter, in sections 3 to 5 the paper will explore the dialogue 
between the legislator and the ECJ leading to the debate on the review of 
Directive 2003/88/EC and the current debate. The focus will be on three 
related important legislative topics: on-call work, the derogations and 
individual opt out from the maximum working time, and the issue of the 
work-life balance. 
 
 
3. On-call Work 
 
In 2003, the ECJ defined in the Simap and Jaeger-judgments8 on-call 
work as working time as meant in Directive 2003/88/EC. The Directive 
only gives the definition of “normal” working time: “any period during 
which the worker is working, at the employers’ disposal and carrying out 
his activity or duties, in accordance with national laws and practice (Art. 2 
par 1 Directive 2003/88/EC). Although the definition in the Directive 
refers to the national laws and practice, the definition of working time is 
not left to these Member States. As it is a Community concept, it must be 
autonomously interpreted.9  
Working time, as defined in the Directive, is posed opposite to rest 
period, defined as any period which is not working time (Art. 2 par. 2 
Directive 2003/88/EC). These two are mutually exclusive notions.10 On-
call work as such is not defined in the Directive. According to the ECJ the 
Directive must be interpreted as meaning that on-call duty 
                                                                                                     
for derogation by collective agreement and for the extension of these agreements 
(Art. 18). 
8 ECJ 3 October 2000, case No. C-303/98 (Simap, hereafter: Simap) and ECJ 3 
September 2003, No. C-151/02 (Jaeger) (hereafter: Jaeger). See for an overview of 
the judgment: Nowak, T. 2008. “The Working Time Directive and the European 
Court of Justice,” MJ, 447-471. 
9 Par. 48 and 50 Simap and 58 Jaeger. 
10 Par. 47 Simap. 
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(Bereitschaftsdienst) performed by a worker where he/she is required to be 
physically present at the work place must be regarded as constituting in its 
totality working time for the purposes of that directive. This holds even 
where the person concerned is allowed to rest at his place of work during 
the periods when his/her services are not required. The ECJ reasons that 
workers on call are required to be present at the place determined by the 
employer and to be available to the employer in order to be able to provide 
their services immediately in case of need.  
 
(...) those obligations, which make it impossible for the doctors concerned 
to choose the place where they stay during waiting periods, must be 
regarded as coming within the ambit of the performance of their duties. 
 
(an employee, CR) on-call duty is subject to appreciably greater 
constraints since he has to remain apart from his family and social 
environment and has less freedom to manage the time during which his 
professional services are not required. Under those conditions an 
employee available at the place determined by the employer cannot be 
regarded as being at rest during the periods of his on-call duty when he is 
not actually carrying on any professional activity.11 
 
 The ECJ adds “that interpretation cannot be called in question by the 
objections based on economic and organisational consequences (...)”.12 
Further, the ECJ states that derogation from the definitions of working 
time and rest period are not allowed for.13 The judgment is that Directive 
2003/88/EC precludes legislation of a Member State which classifies 
employee’s periods of inactivity in the context of such on-call duty as rest 
periods.14 The fact that the total amount of on-call time constitutes 
working time does not, however, preclude national laws or collective 
agreements to differentiate between time actually worked or on-call time 
during which the worker is at rest with regard to the payment for the 
shift.15 Therefore, differences in payment between active and inactive 
hours of the on-call service are permitted.  
The “black and white” approach of the ECJ in sectors where use of on-
call work is made led to problems. With on-call work, the limits of the 
                                                 
11 Par. 63 Jaeger. 
12 Par. 66 Jaeger. 
13 Par. 91 Jaeger. 
14 Confirmed in; ECJ 1 December 2005, nr. C- 14/04 (Dellas). 
15 ECJ 11 January 2007, nr. C-437/05 (Vorel/ Ceský Krumlov). 
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weekly working time were now trespassed.16 When the weekly working 
times were adjusted to the new way of counting hours when on-call, the 
workers would face a reduction in payment since they would make less 
(fully) paid hours. In the Netherlands and ten other Member States, the 
solution has been to fully count the on-call work as working time and to 
introduce the individual opt out of the maximum weekly working time.17 
In several other Member States, despite the Courts rulings, on-call work is 
still not fully treated as working time. This means non-compliance with 
the Directive. From the European Commission’s report on the 
implementation of the Working Time Directive, it is now clear that 14 
Member States and the employers call for a more flexible approach in the 
Directive towards the definition of working time in case of on-call work.18 
The European trade unions, however, do not accept that the 
implementation of the Simap-Jaeger judgments would suffer “insuperable 
obstacles” and are only prepared to seek a way out when the relevant 
definitions remain unchanged and the use of the opt out will be 
restricted.19 They refer to the protection of the Directive as based on 
fundamental social rights that must be respected and built upon.  
The contrasting views between the European social partners, however, 
obscure the fact that the problem of on-call work is not new at all. Since 
the first occurrence of on-call work, at a decentralised level in the Member 
States, the social partners have concluded provisions to regulate this form 
of employment, the count of active and inactive hours as working time and 
the payment for these active and inactive hours. Usually a fixed percentage 
of the on-call hours calculates as working time and the active and inactive 
hours are pro rata being paid for. Where the un-nuanced approach of the 
legislator and ECJ has caused the social partners to take diametrically 
opposed points of view, the actors at European level could learn from their 
own old school results of the social dialogue at sectoral level within the 
                                                 
16 It causes problems with the minimum rest as well: European Commission. 2010. 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on 
the implementation by Members States of Directive 2003/88/EC (“the Working 
Time Directive”), COM (2010) 802 final. Brussels: European Commission, 2.  
17 Ibid., 4.  
18 Ibid., 8-9. 
19 European Commission. 2010. Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions, Reviewing the Working Time Directive (Second-
phase Consultation of the Social Partners at European Level under Article 154 
TFEU). Brussels: European Commission, 4. 
The Review of the EU Working Time Directive 
 
8 
Member States. A proposal for a draft new Directive on working time 
could just like the 2005 proposal of the Commission20 include “adding a 
shade of grey”: a definition of on-call work, where the actual 
differentiation is left to the social partners at the appropriate level within 
the Member States. A point of reference would be to stipulate that all of 
the actively worked time on-call would count as working time.  
 
 
4. Maximum Weekly Working Time, Derogations  
and Opt-out 
 
In order to allow for flexibility in the application of certain provisions 
of the Directive 2003/88/EC, the Directive permits several types of 
derogations. First of all, Art. 17 declares derogation possible from the 
maximum weekly working time and minimum rest, the length of night 
work and the reference periods for the so-called unmeasured working time 
and for “autonomous” workers (Art. 17 par 1 Directive 2003/88/EC). The 
latter refers to workers who can determine their working time for 
themselves. Barnard, Deakin and Hobbs warned earlier that whenever 
flexibility in the Directive is restricted, the derogation of the unmeasured 
working time and/or the autonomous worker will be the next escape 
employers would want to utilise.21 The European Commission now 
proposes to avoid abuse by specifying that this derogation only applies to 
senior managers and other workers with “genuine and effective autonomy 
over both the amount and the organisation of working time”.22 A remark 
here would be that the demarcation between dependant and autonomous 
workers is always a problem. The Commission’s suggestion still leaves 
ample leeway for interpretation of specific cases at hand. The additional 
specification of autonomous workers will be most helpful for the courts in 
deciding on such cases.  
 Art. 17 par. 3 allows for derogations of the minimum rest, length of 
night work and reference periods23 (but not the maximum weekly working 
time!), for certain activities: 
                                                 
20 European Commission, 31 May 2005, COM(2005)246 final. 
21 Barnard, C., S. Deakin, and R. Hobbs. 2003. “Opting Out of the 48-hour Week: 
Employer Necessity or Individual Choice? An Empirical Study of the Operation of 
Article 18(1)(B) of the Working Time Directive in the UK,” Industrial Law 
Journal, December. 
22 COM(2010) 801 final, 13. 
23 Art. 19 gives further limitations on the derogation of the provisions about the 
reference periods of Art. 17 par. 3 Directive 2003/88/EC.  
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- that are at distance of the workers home (off shore work, for 
instance); 
- that require permanent presence to protect property of persons; 
- that need continuity in service or production; 
- and where there is a foreseeable surge in production (agriculture or 
tourism, for instance).  
Another type of derogation is regulated in Art. 17 par. 3 as well: the 
derogation for workers in railway transport. Further, the Directive builds 
in Art. 17 par. 3 the option to limit or exclude from application of the 
Directives’ provisions where occurrences are due to unusual and 
unforeseeable circumstances, beyond the employers’ control, or to 
exceptional events, the consequences of which could not have been 
avoided despite the exercise of all due care (par. 2 f) or in case there is an 
accident or imminent risk of accident (par. 2 g). Next, in case of shift 
work, certain derogations from the provisions on daily and weekly rest are 
allowed for (Art. 17 par. 4 Directive 2003/88/EC). Lastly, ample 
derogations are possible for doctors in training (Art. 17 par. 5 Directive 
2003/88/EC).  
For all of these derogations, it holds that in case of derogation by 
national law or collective agreement, the worker is entitled to equivalent 
periods of compensatory rest, or, in exceptional cases where that is not 
possible for objective reasons, workers are afforded appropriate protection. 
This “safety net” is one example of an unexplored element in the dialogue. 
In the Jaeger-case the ECJ has explained that the compensatory rest should 
follow immediately after the extended working time. Compensatory rest 
that is not immediately linked with the period of work extended does not 
adequately take into account the general principles of protection the safety 
and health of workers.24 The Court states in Isère25 that it only allows for 
alternative protection in entirely exceptional cases where granting 
compensatory rest is not possible for objective reasons. It is clear the ECJ 
interprets the provision in strictly in light of the aim of protection, and 
refers to “objective reasons” or justification. It would be interesting to see 
in future when alternative protection is allowed and when it is not.  
In Art. 18 yet another type of derogation is to be found. Derogations of 
the minimum rest, length of night work and reference periods26 (but again 
not from the maximum weekly working time!), can be made by collective 
agreement between the two sides of industry at national or at the 
                                                 
24 Par. 94 and 97 Jaeger. 
25 Par. 54 and 55 ECJ 14 October 2010, Case nr. C-428/09 (Union syndicale 
Solidares Isère v Premier Ministre and others, hereafter: Isère). 
26 Art. 19 Directive 2003/88/EC applies here as well.  
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appropriate decentralised level. Again, in such a case, the worker is 
granted equivalent periods of compensatory rest, or, in exceptional cases 
where that is not possible for objective reasons, workers are afforded 
appropriate protection.  
The articles on minimum rest and the length of night work do not 
apply to mobile workers, and off shore work (Art. 20), and those 
provisions, plus the provision on the maximum weekly working time, do 
not apply to workers on board of seagoing fishing vessels (Art. 21 
Directive 2003/88/EC).  
Apart from the national or collective options to derogate from the 
Directive, according to Art. 22 it is possible to opt out at individual level 
from the maximum weekly working time. After fierce opposition of the 
UK that resisted the enactment of the (1993) Working Time Directive, an 
individual option to “opt-out” on the maximum working week of 48 hours 
was incorporated in the Directive (Art. 22 par. 1 and 2 Directive 
2003/88/EC). 
At national level, the Member State can allow for this individual opt-
out. If that is the case, the general principles of the protection of the health 
and safety of workers should be respected. This is another example of the 
protective nature of the Directives’ provision, whose meaning is not 
clearly known yet. The Directive requires then that the employer obtains 
the worker’s consent to work more than the maximum of 48 hours. In an 
attempt to empower the worker as much as possible with regard to the 
acceptance, the ECJ has interpreted this requirement of consent rather 
strictly.27 The consent must be “expressly and freely” given by each 
worker individually in order for the 48-hour maximum period of weekly 
working time to be validly extended. Whenever an employee decides not 
to consent, the ECJ states that in order to ensure the useful effect of the 
Directive, the worker in such a case is protected against victimisation.28  
According to the ECJ, such an extension is not valid when the 
employment contract refers to a collective agreement which permits such 
an extension. Flexibility with regard to the maximum working time thus is 
possible, although procedurally strictly regulated. One could wonder if 
here the legislator and the ECJ rely too heavily on the procedural limits 
with regard to the opt-out and neglect the reality that an employee often 
will be confronted with a “standard take it or leave it form” at the moment 
                                                 
27 ECJ, 5 October 2004, cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 (Pfeiffer/ Deutsches Rotes 
Kreuz). 
28 ECJ 14 October 2010, case C-243/09 (Fuss/ Stadt Halle), The ECJ relates its 
judgment to the fundamental right to effective judicial protection (Art. 47 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union).  
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of formation of the contract29 or faces the risk that a temporary contract 
would not be extended. The approach of  both the legislator and the ECJ 
and the impact the opt-out has on the worker’s protection seem to call for 
additional collective protection. The European Commission wishes the 
social partners to agree upon (the limitation of) the opt-out in the review of 
the present Directive. Business Europe wants to keep the opt-out 
underlined, CEEP and UEAPME are reserved about any changes towards 
the opt out, although CEEP “regrets its rapid spread in public services”.30 
The trade unions ETUC and EPSU take the opposite standpoint: the opt-
out should be put to an end. 31 The problem of de facto “unfree” individual 
consent and the impasse between the social partners perhaps could be 
solved by at least temporarily, by finding “a middle way”. That would 
mean upholding the opt-out, but adding security at the collective level. An 
idea would be to demand that, before the recourse to the opt-out at an 
individual level, the collective agreement between the sectoral social 
partners would have to permit the option to use the individual opt-out.  
 
 
5. Flexible Working Time and Work-life Balance 
 
The current working time Directive does not include any provisions on 
work-life balance. To support the arguments in favour of working time 
flexibilisation, the European Commission reasons as mentioned before that 
this type of flexibilisation suits the needs for flexibility in light of private 
care duties as well. However, that assertion seems to be rather 
generalising, as the concurrence of the need for and realisation of the 
employers’ wish for working time flexibility, alongside the need for and 
realisation of combination security, will only take place for certain 
workers at a certain time. Since the interests of the workers with regard to 
combination and income security are diversified and will probably vary 
even further over time, it seems to be of utmost relevance to enhance the 
workers’ information on and say over his or her working time. 
Communication with the employer over working time is thus essential. 
Since the Directive on working time neglects the issue of combination 
security, there seems to be a task left for the EU to further these matches 
between the employers’ and the employees’ demands. The European 
                                                 
29 Collins, H., 2005. “European Social Policy and Contract Law,” ERCL 2005/1, 
123. 
30 COM(2010) 801 (final), 4. 
31 Ibid. 
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Commission indeed has put the item on the legislative agenda. The 
Commission proposes that the social partners pay attention to this issue 
since the lack of protection (the lack of information rights about time 
schedules and lacking rights with regard to requests to individual changes 
of the time schedules in particular), “creates a serious challenge for 
reconciling work with family life and for general work/life balance”.32 The 
Commission suggests including in the envisaged review of the Directive: 
- encouragement for the social partners to agree at the appropriate level 
aimed at supporting reconciliation of work and family life; 
- a right to information well in advance about substantial change to the 
pattern of work; 
- an employers’ obligation to examine workers’ requests to change 
their working hours and patterns, in the light of each other’s needs for 
flexibility, and to give reasons for refusing such requests.  
The aim to improve the work-life balance suits to Art. 3 TEU. Within 
the context of a single EU market, the Community has set the social 
objectives to: 
 
(…) promote throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and 
sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of 
employment and of social protection, equality between men and women, 
sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness 
and convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of the 
standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion 
and solidarity among Member States. (Art. 3 par. 3 TEU, bold font 
added).  
 
The question is, however, whether the current legal base of the 
Directive (Art. 188a EC, now Art. 153 par. 1 sub a TFEU) could serve as 
the legal basis for such provisions? In the Jaeger-judgment the ECJ states:  
 
In that regard it is clear from paragraph 15 of the judgment in United 
Kingdom v Council that the concepts of “safety” and “health” as used in 
Article 118a of the Treaty, on which Directive 93/104 is based, should be 
interpreted widely as embracing all factors, physical or otherwise, capable 
of affecting the health and safety of the worker in his working 
environment, including in particular certain aspects of the organisation of 
working time. At the same paragraph of that judgment the Court further 
noted that such an interpretation derives support in particular from the 
preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organisation to which 
                                                 
32 COM(2010)801 final, 12. 
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all the Member States belong. Health is there defined as a state of 
complete physical, mental and social well-being that does not consist only 
in the absence of illness or infirmity.33  
 
Although the ECJ interprets the “health and safety” ground 
extensively, evidence that the work-life balance directly influences worker 
health or safety is lacking. Therefore, it is doubtful whether Art. 153 par 1 
sub a can serve as a legal basis. In the author’s view, the legal basis should 
be broadened, to, for instance, sub b, the working conditions. If a problem 
in political terms, the alternative seems to be to encourage the social 
partners to take on the topic and agree upon a social partner agreement (as 
in Art. 155 TFEU). The prospect of such happening seems bleak, 
according to the Commission’s Communication about the second-phase 
review, only the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) shows an 
interest in the topic. Again, legislative results at national level are 
discarded: for instance in the Netherlands and Germany far-reaching 
legislation on work-life balance and workers’ requests with regard to 
change to working time or pattern is already in place. Perhaps the dialogue 
on this issue could be stimulated by Member States who have already 
enacted legislation on the work-life balance bottom up via the national 
social partners.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The question addressed in this paper is whether or not the dialogue in 
the past few years on different aspects of the regulation of flexible 
working time has resulted only in opposing views. A close examination of 
the dialogue between the EU legislator, the ECJ and the social partners—
at European and at a decentralised level—has showed that, despite the 
expressed contrasting views, existing results of the dialogue between 
(sectoral) social partners within the Member States or national legislation 
might give clues for breakthroughs with regard to the contested legislative 
topics of on-call work, derogations, opt-out and work-life balance. With 
regard to on-call work, the black and white approach of the legislator and 
the ECJ towards the definition of working time should be more nuanced. 
A proposal for a draft new Directive on working time could include a 
definition of on-call work, where the actual differentiation is left to the 
social partners at the appropriate level within the Member States. The 
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point of reference would be to stipulate that all of the actively worked time 
on-call would count as working time.  
With regard to the derogations for the so-called autonomous worker it 
is noted that, in general, the demarcation between dependant and 
autonomous workers, in the light of protection of the former, is a well 
known and persisting problem in labour law. The Commission’s 
suggestion to specify the characteristics of the autonomous worker still 
leaves ample leeway for interpretation of specific cases at hand. The 
suggested additional specification of autonomous workers will be at 
maximum helpful for the courts in deciding on such cases.  
For most derogations in the Directive it holds that, in case of 
derogation by national law or collective agreement, the worker is entitled 
to equivalent periods of compensatory rest, or, in exceptional cases where 
that is not possible for objective reasons, workers are afforded appropriate 
protection. This “safety net” is one example of an as yet unexplored 
element in the dialogue. It is clear that the ECJ interprets the provision 
strictly in the light of the aim of protection and demands for alternative 
protection “objective reasons” or justification. It would be interesting to 
see in future when alternative protection is allowed and when it is not. 
With regard to the opt-out provision in the dialogue the ECJ has 
interpreted the provision on the opt-out strictly with regard to its 
procedural aspects. However, the problem of de facto “unfree” individual 
consent and the (severe) effects on worker protection remains. Currently, 
the social partners express contrasting views with regard to the question 
whether or not to keep the opt-out in place. Here, perhaps meeting “half-
way” would lead to, at least a temporary solution. This would mean 
upholding the opt-out, but adding security at the collective level. In this 
paper, an idea is suggested to only allow for individual opt-out when the 
collective agreement between the (sectoral) social partners permits that. 
Finally, with regard to the issue of work-life balance, the Commission has 
made cautious suggestions to improve work-life balance. However, the 
legal base for such provisions in a health and safety Directive might be 
contested. The prospect of actually realising improvement in this area 
seems bleak, since only the ETUC shows an interest in the topic. Again, 
existing legislative results at the national level are disregarded at the 
European level. The Member States who have already enacted legislation 
on the work-life balance could perhaps step forward and stimulate via the 
national dialogue with the social partners the debate between the social 
partners at European level on this matter.  
The dialogue on the regulation of working time will continue and will 
remain an interesting matter for legal debate. 
Ceciel Rayer 
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